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INSTITUTIONALIZING CONSENT MYTHS
IN GRADE SCHOOL
SHAWN E. FIELDS
Scholars and advocates have long decried antiquated notions of consent
in the criminal law of rape and sexual assault. Significant progress has
been made to redefine consent in criminal codes and in our collective
consciousness as freely given, informed, enthusiastic, explicit, revocable,
and to be considered from the perspective of the consenting party. But
despite this progress, the criminal justice apparatus continues to fixate on
details irrelevant to the consent calculus, such as the victim’s dress, when
making evaluations about consent. This obsession with the victim’s clothing
reflects a troubling willingness to imply consent or, alternatively, blame the
victim for provocatively “asking for it.” Significant scholarship has
demonstrated the corrosive impact of this fixation, resulting in a
“credibility discount” of women making sexual violence allegations, the
acquittal of defendants engaged in clearly criminal sexual conduct, and a
concomitant reluctance of female victims of sexual violence to even engage
with the criminal justice system.
None of the foregoing is new or particularly controversial. But while this
unfortunate reality has been well examined, this Article reflects upon a
lesser-explored, early root cause of the status quo: the hard wiring of
consent myths in grade school through gendered dress codes and the
gendered messaging these dress codes institutionalize about consent.
Increasingly pervasive, increasingly sex-obsessed dress codes feed
narratives at an early age that girls are sexual objects who are responsible
for the assaultive behavior of perpetrators and who “ask for” any
unwanted sexual attention their dress may attract.
This Article highlights the dangerous, highly sexualized justification
often given by school administrators for gendered dress codes: a desire to
create a “distraction-free learning environment” for boys. This messaging
sexualizes underage girls, forces them to become hyper-cognizant about
their physical identity, and signals a male entitlement to act inappropriately
* Assistant Professor of Law, Campbell University School of Law; J.D., Boston
University School of Law; B.A., Yale University. Thank you to Professor Erin Sheley for
the invitation to participate in this symposium, to the editors and staff of the Oklahoma Law
Review for drawing attention to this important issue, and to Professors Noël Harlow and
Tony Ghiotto for their insightful comments on earlier drafts of this Article.
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towards the female body for which the female will be punished. At root,
these dress codes, and the justifications behind them, normalize and excuse
sexually predatory behavior as a natural “distracted” reaction while
blaming the victim for provoking the unwanted behavior. This
institutionalization—which continues to grow—naturally feeds corrosive
narratives that persist in criminal sexual assault adjudications, including
implied consent, the requirement of a “perfect victim,” and the myth of the
“unstoppable male.”
I. Introduction
In 2015, a dress code policy at Woodford County High School in
Versailles, Kentucky received national media attention when a student who
appeared to be dressed appropriately was nevertheless sent home because
her collarbone was exposed.1 A photo of the student wearing the outfit in
question soon went viral on the internet and led to confusion about the
nature of her offense (see Figure 1).2 According to the school, her clothing
amounted to a technical violation of its facially gender neutral dress code,
which prohibited skirts and shorts that fall above the knee and shirts that
extend below the collarbone.3
The rationale behind the dress code and the enforcement of this technical
violation—“that certain articles of girls’ attire should be prohibited because
they ‘distract’ boys”—led students at the school to take action.4 After
finding that “[g]irls were disciplined disproportionately” and were
unilaterally singled out for causing a distraction to the opposite sex, several
students led an online campaign to protest what they viewed as sexist dress

1. See Ashley Lewis, Kentucky High School Students, Parents Fight Strict Dress Code
That Requires Girls to Cover Collarbone, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 17, 2015, 3:36 PM),
https://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/female-student-reprimanded-showingcollarbone-article-1.2328582.
2. Id. (“The angry parent posted a picture of the offending outfit – a creme tank top
with a white cardigan – which was shared nearly 40,000 times.”).
3. Esther Crain, Teen’s Exposed Collarbone Sets Off Dress Code Controversy,
YAHOO! NEWS (Aug. 18, 2015), https://news.yahoo.com/teens-exposed-collarbone-sets-offdress-code-127004652707.html.
4. Li Zhou, The Sexism of School Dress Codes, ATLANTIC (Oct. 20, 2015),
https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2015/10/school-dress-codes-are-problematic/
410962/.
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Figure 1
codes.5 “Many of these protests have criticized the dress codes as sexist in
that they unfairly target girls by body-shaming and blaming them for
promoting sexual harassment.”6
This episode illustrates the many ways so-called “modesty-based” dress
codes7 institutionalize myths about sex and consent. Dress codes
disproportionately target and affect girls for their inherently dangerous and
5. Id.; see also Rachael Krishna, Young Women Are Protesting Against Dress Codes
With #IAmMoreThanaDistraction, BUZZFEED NEWS (Sept. 4, 2015, 12:01 PM ET), https://
www.buzzfeednews.com/article/krishrach/young-women-are-protesting-against-dress-codeswith-iammoret.
6. Zhou, supra note 4.
7. Deborah M. Ahrens & Andrew M. Siegel, Of Dress and Redress: Student Dress
Restrictions in Constitutional Law and Culture, 54 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 49, 76 (2019)
(summarizing the harms of “imposing modesty-based dress restrictions on female students”).
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distracting bodies.8 They sexualize minor female bodies, place the onus on
girls to take steps to prevent being objectified, and then place blame on girls
for the sexually predatory actions of others.9 In addition, the dress codes
excuse boys for improper conduct because they simply cannot resist certain
temptations.10 Finally, the dress codes reinforce the notion that girls who
dress a certain way impliedly consent to otherwise unwanted behavior and
are less deserving of society’s protection.
The problem is pervasive and growing. Written, mandatory dress codes
exist in approximately sixty percent of the public schools in the United
States, up from just under forty percent in 1990.11 Many of these dress
codes explicitly set different standards for boys and girls, often requiring
only girls to prevent showing collarbones or shoulders, underwear, or
cleavage or bra straps.12 Many other facially neutral dress codes
disproportionately affect girls, including prohibiting spaghetti strap tank

8. Meredith Johnson Harbach, Sexualization, Sex Discrimination, and Public School
Dress Codes, 50 U. RICH. L. REV. 1039, 1043 (2016) (“[M]any dress codes are explicitly
gender-specific . . . or are at least selectively enforced such that they impact female students
disproportionately.”); see also Jolie Lee, Dress Code Crackdown: N.Y. School Hands Out
200 Detentions, USA TODAY (Sept. 15, 2014, 10:25 AM ET), https://www.usatoday.com/
story/news/nation-now/2014/09/15/dress-code-tottenville-high-school-new-york/15657299/
(recalling the imposition of a new dress code at Tottenville High School in Staten Island
where “90% of the [dress code-related] detentions went to female students”).
9. See Harbach, supra note 8, at 1058 (placing gendered dress codes in “a broader
cultural setting that too frequently sexualizes females and blames them for unwanted sexual
attention”); Zhou, supra note 4 (“[O]ne of the key concerns is the implication that women
should be hypercognizant about their physical identity and how the world responds to it.”);
see also id. (quoting a female high school student who claimed, “My principal constantly
says that the main reason for [it] is to create a ‘distraction-free learning zone’ for our male
counterparts.”).
10. See Harbach, supra note 8, at 1044.
11. See Ahrens & Siegel, supra note 7, at 61 n.58; Zhou, supra note 4; see also Fast
Facts: School Uniforms, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, https://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/
display.asp?id=50 (last visited May 28, 2020) (“From 1999-2000 to 2015-16, the percentage
of public schools reporting that they required students to wear uniforms increased from 12 to
21 percent.”).
12. Judith Valente, Kingsley Junior High Dress Code Targeting ‘Bra Straps, Cleavage’
Unleashes Backlash, WGLT.ORG (Apr. 28, 2017), https://www.wglt.org/post/kingsleyjunior-high-dress-code-targeting-bra-straps-cleavage-unleashes-backlash#stream/0 (quoting
message to parents from principal regarding dress code) (“Shorts should cover students’
entire bottoms, there should be no bare shoulders, no visible bra straps and no midriff
showing. Shirts that show excessive cleavage are also not appropriate for school.”).
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tops, shorts above the knee, or the showing of midriffs.13 Constitutional
challenges to these dress codes have largely been unsuccessful, as courts
have found legitimate justifications based on fostering a productive learning
environment.14 But recent compelling evidence showing that dress-codeviolating girls are disproportionately punished compared to their dresscode-violating male counterparts may offer a future avenue for these
claims, particularly given the significant disruption to the educational
experience brought by forcing a violator to remedy a dress code
infringement.15
Beyond litigation, this Article draws on the obvious and troubling
parallels between school dress code enforcement and criminal sexual
assault adjudication to explore how seemingly innocuous modesty-based
dress codes perpetuate a male-centric system of implied consent and
general entitlement to sexual conduct. By confronting the shocking ways
children internalize myths about male sexual entitlement, morally inferior
victims, and excusable predatory urges, this Article contends that needed
change can, and should, take place more urgently both in the schoolhouse
and the courthouse.
II. A Brief History of School Dress Codes
Formal school dress codes, including the adoption of school uniform
policies, are a surprisingly recent phenomenon in American public

13. See Steve Nelson, Dress Codes in Schools: Spaghetti Straps, Midriffs; Adults’ Need
for Control, HUFFPOST (May 31, 2016, 12:55 PM ET), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/
dress-codes-in-schools-sp_b_10223596.
14. See, e.g., Blau v. Fort Thomas Pub. Sch. Dist., 401 F.3d 381, 392, 393 (6th Cir.
2005) (rejecting First Amendment challenges to modesty-based dress codes in part because
teachers claimed the dress code “led to fewer ‘disruptions and distractions from students
wearing revealing, distracting, and inappropriate clothing’”); Littlefield v. Forney Indep.
Sch. Dist., 268 F.3d 275, 291 (5th Cir. 2001) (“While Parents may have a fundamental right
in the upbringing and education of their children, this right does not cover the Parents’
objection to a public school Uniform Policy.”); see also Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 578
(1975) (finding that issues of public education are generally “committed to the control of
state and local authorities”).
15. For a discussion of the disproportionate impact of school dress code enforcement on
girls, see infra Part II. See also Jeldness v. Pearce, 30 F.3d 1220, 1229–30 (9th Cir. 1994)
(explaining that under Title IX, “once plaintiffs have shown that a facially neutral practice
has a disparate impact, defendant[s] may still prevail by proving a business or educational
necessity for the practice”) (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971))).
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schools.16 This Part provides context for the evolution of dress code
policies, from an informal system of heteronormative assimilation to
increasingly formal authoritative attempts to address political protests,
“countercultural” expressions, gang and other violence, and the purported
rise of child sexualization.
The United States has a largely unwritten history of public school dress
norms and restrictions. “As best as scholars have been able to determine,
dress norms and expectations were ubiquitous in American education up
until the late 1960s, but formal dress codes were surprisingly rare and
public school uniforms were almost—perhaps entirely—unheard of.”17
“Despite the persistent use of dress and appearance norms to stifle the
cultural expression of minority groups and to foster assimilation throughout
American society,” little record exists of formal policies mandating such
uniformity in public schools prior to the period of cultural upheaval
defining the 1960s and 1970s.18
A. Pre-Tinker: Counterculture, Vietnam, and Free Expression
Child psychologists have long observed that the adolescent period marks
an important moment for children to find individuality in their expressive
selves, separate from the adults around them.19 The “Baby Boom”
generation reached adolescence at roughly the same time the United States
began fracturing along cultural and political lines, highlighted most
prominently by the civil rights movement and the war in Vietnam.20 Not
surprisingly, students in this period “adopted new clothing styles and

16. See Ahrens & Siegel, supra note 7, at 61.
17. Id. at 55 (“Styles and expectations for dress were typically set by students’ peers and
the larger community, turned on material availability, reinforced gender and class norms,
and reflected broader cultural values.”).
18. See id. at 55–56; see also Deanna J. Glickman, Fashioning Children: Gender
Restrictive Dress Codes as an Entry Point for the Trans* School to Prison Pipeline, 24 AM.
U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 263, 284 (2015); Jessica A. Clarke, They, Them, and Theirs,
132 HARV. L. REV. 894, 965 (2019) (discussing adverse impacts of rise in gendered dress
codes on trans and gender-queer students).
19. See Maria Piacentini & Greig Miler, Symbolic Consumption in Teenagers’ Clothing
Choices, 3 J. CONSUMER BEHAV. 251, 261 (2004); MORRIS ROSENBERG, SOCIETY AND THE
ADOLESCENT SELF-IMAGE 3–4 (1965).
20. TODD GITLIN, THE SIXTIES: YEARS OF HOPE, DAYS OF RAGE 18 (1987); see James
Wright, The Baby Boomer War, NY TIMES (Apr. 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/04/11/opinion/the-baby-boomer-war.html?auth=login-email&login=email.
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grooming habits—chosen in part to intentionally differentiate themselves
from older generations and established cultural norms.”21
In response, “representatives of those generations and norms pushed
back, adopting increasingly formal and specific guidelines for student dress,
hair length, and facial hair.”22 These guidelines arose not from a concern
about school safety or a desire to protect the sanctity of the learning
environment, but from a fracturing of established norms and a stated desire
to maintain assimilative notions of white, male, heteronormative, and
inherently conservative uniformity.23
This overt attempt to mandate such cultural uniformity, however, was
short-lived. During a decade of litigation contesting these dress codes on
First Amendment expression and substantive due process grounds, students
won a string of victories in state and federal court recognizing the
constitutional right of students to express themselves through their
presentation and to retain a zone of autonomy in the dress and presentation
choices they made.24 Reflecting the general attitude of courts at the time—
an attitude that seems positively foreign in today’s educational climate—
one California court expressed not only “great skepticism as to whether
uniform policies were legal [but] great confusion as to why a district would
feel the need or authority to adopt one.”25
The most famous and enduring decision from this period, Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School District,26 laid down the parameters
still in use today for determining the constitutionality of a school dress code
provision. The United States Supreme Court considered First Amendment
challenges to a school’s suspension of students for wearing black armbands

21. Ahrens & Siegel, supra note 7, at 56.
22. Id.; see also Karr v. Schmidt, 460 F.2d 609, 610 (5th Cir. 1972) (en banc) (“This is
another of the multitude of lawsuits which have recently inundated the federal courts
attacking hair length regulations promulgated by local public school authorities.”).
23. Cf. Ahrens & Siegel, supra note 7, at 55 (explaining that dress codes were
persistently used to encourage adherence to cultural norms).
24. See, e.g., Massie v. Henry, 455 F.2d 779, 783 (4th Cir. 1972) (finding that the hair
length regulation lacked justification for infringing on the student’s rights); Richards v.
Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281, 1286 (1st Cir. 1970) (concluding that the suspension of a student
for wearing his hair too long violated his constitutional personal liberties). But see Jackson v.
Dorrier, 424 F.2d 213, 218 (6th Cir. 1970) (upholding hair length regulation).
25. Ahrens & Siegel, supra note 7, at 57; see Noonan v. Green, 80 Cal. Rptr. 513, 515
(Cal. Ct. App. 1969).
26. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
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in protest of the Vietnam War.27 The Court famously explained that
“[n]either students [n]or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom
of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate,” finding that schools can
only restrict such conduct if it would “materially and substantially interfere
with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the
school.”28 Applying this standard, the Court invalidated the school
suspensions as they were motivated by “a mere desire to avoid the
discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular
viewpoint.”29
Courts following Tinker interpreted the Court’s language as requiring
some hard evidence, rather than mere conjecture, that a restriction on
expression was necessary to allow a school “to carry out [its] educational
mission.”30 Few opportunities existed to test this new stringent approach,
however, as formal school dress codes began to disappear from public
school handbooks shortly after the 1969 Tinker decision.31
B. Post-Tinker: The Rise of Formal Dress Code Policies
After nearly a generation of relative silence, school dress codes became a
topic of concern once again in the 1990s. Only this time, dress codes were
heralded as a potential solution to the purported scourge of gang violence
infecting public schools.32 This cultural and political shift reflected the
27. Id. at 504–05.
28. Id. at 506, 509 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)).
29. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509.
30. See, e.g., Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d 1069, 1075 (8th Cir. 1971) (determining that
under the circumstances it was not “necessary to infringe on the students’ right to carry out
the educational mission of the school”); Wallace v. Ford, 346 F. Supp. 156, 162 (E.D. Ark.
1972) (explaining that students possess broad freedoms “subject [only] to the right of the
school authorities to establish [necessary] regulations”).
31. See generally Larry D. Bartlett, Hair and Dress Codes Revisited, 33 EDUC. L. REP.
7, 7–8 (1986); see also Ahrens & Siegel, supra note 7, at 59 (“The Supreme Court failed to
decide a case involving more general student dress or appearance restrictions before those
cases dried up due to the disappearance of such restrictions.”).
32. Alison Mitchell, Clinton Will Advise Schools on Uniforms, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 25,
1996),
https://www.nytimes.com/1996/02/25/us/clinton-will-advise-schools-on-uniforms.
html (“‘If it means that teen-agers will stop killing each other over designer jackets,’ the
President said in his weekly radio address, ‘then our public schools should be able to require
their students to require school uniforms. . . . If it means that the schoolrooms will be more
orderly, more disciplined, . . . and that our young people will learn to evaluate themselves by
what they are on the inside instead of what they’re wearing on the outside, then our public
schools should be able to require their students to wear school uniforms.’”).
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nation’s larger cultural commitment to solving societal problems through
increased emphasis on “law and order,” zero tolerance policies, and
punishment.33 The post-civil rights “law and order” era “spawned an entire
culture oriented around the values . . . of policing,” and “law enforcement
became the paradigm through which American society identified problems
and conceptualized solutions.”34 Unsurprisingly, as this cultural shift
produced a racially-tinged mass incarceration epidemic among adults,
increasingly draconian and racially-tinged dress codes led to rapid increases
in enforcement against children in public schools.35
President Clinton twice advocated for school dress codes and uniform
policies in successive State of the Union addresses, and officials in the
Clinton Administration adopted policies encouraging the use of uniform
policies and strict dress codes.36 A 1996 “Manual on School Uniforms”
33. See Vesla M. Weaver, Frontlash: Race and the Development of Punitive Crime
Policy, 21 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 230, 230 (2007); see also Ann Scott Tyson, Schools Fight
Gang Colors by Pushing Uniform Gray, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Apr. 12, 1996),
https://www.csmonitor.com/1996/0412/12031.html (describing use of armed police officers
by one high school on the south side of Chicago to enforce dress designed to prevent
students from wearing gang colors, even if the codes have a disproportionate impact on
African American youth wearing designer basketball sneakers).
34. Ahrens & Siegel, supra note 7, at 69; see also JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING
THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND
CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR 3–5 (2009) (“Americans have built a new civil and political
order structured around the problem of violent crime.”).
35. Weaver, supra note 33, at 230; see also Mark Peffley & Jon Hurwitz, The Racial
Components of “Race-Neutral” Crime Policy Attitudes, 23 POL. PSYCHOL. 59, 67 (2002);
Julia Azari, From Wallace to Trump, the Evolution of “Law and Order,” FIVETHIRTYEIGHT
(Mar. 13, 2016, 5:41 PM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/from-wallace-to-trump-theevolution-of-law-and-order/ (“In the 1980s and 1990s, the politics of crime turned distinctly
punitive and remained racially coded.”); Nadra Nittle, How Kids’ Obsession with Air
Jordans Helped Lead to School Uniforms and Stricter Dress Codes, VOX (Oct. 10, 2018,
4:50 PM EDT), https://www.vox.com/the-goods/2018/10/10/17961124/air-jordans-sneakerviolence-black-youth-school-dress-codes-school-uniforms (connecting declines in school
dress codes in the early 1980s with a rise in conservative “preppy” dress that administrators
found more appealing, and the concomitant rise in dress codes in the late 1980s with the
increased popularity of basketball sneakers) (“The press largely painted sneakerheads as
violent and materialistic[.]”).
36. President William Jefferson Clinton, State of the Union Address (Jan. 23, 1996),
https://clintonwhitehouse2.archives.gov/WH/New/other/sotu.html (“[O]ur public schools
should be able to require their students to wear school uniforms.”); [Bill Clinton], 1997 State
of the Union Address, WASH. POST (Feb. 4, 1997), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/politics/special/states/docs/sou97.htm (“And we must continue to promote order and
discipline; supporting communities that introduce school uniforms, impose curfews, enforce
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published by the Department of Justice Office of Elementary and
Secondary School Education37 explained in its second sentence that
communities were adopting school uniform policies specifically “[i]n
response to growing levels of violence in [American] schools.” 38
Remarking that a “safe and disciplined learning environment is the first
requirement of a good school”39 (as opposed to a nurturing, stimulating, or
intellectually challenging environment), the manual noted that strict dress
codes offer the following benefits:
$

decreasing violence and theft . . . among students over
designer clothing and expensive sneakers;

$

helping prevent gang members from wearing gang
colors and insignia at school;

$

instilling students with discipline;

$

helping parents and students resist peer pressure;

$

helping students concentrate on their school work; and

$

helping school officials recognize intruders who come to
the school.40

Other Clinton administration guidelines regarding school dress codes
reminded districts to respect religious and political expression and to avoid
using unconstitutionally vague and overbroad language, but otherwise
proceeded on the assumption that any dress code policy rationally
connected to safety, discipline, or “helping students concentrate on their
[school] work” would survive judicial scrutiny.41 That assumption appears
to have proven correct in hindsight, as virtually all challenges to school
dress code policies since that time—at least ones premised on broad,
truancy laws, remove disruptive students from the classroom, and have zero tolerance for
guns and drugs in schools.”).
37. OFFICE OF ELEMENTARY & SECONDARY EDUC., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MANUAL ON
SCHOOL UNIFORMS (1996), https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED387947.pdf. The fact that this
manual on educational dress was published by the Department of Justice and not the
Department of Education further illustrates the punitive purposes behind dress code and
uniform policies of the time.
38. Id. at 3.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.; see also Ahrens & Siegel, supra note 7, at 62.
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constitutional rights to free expression and substantive autonomy—have
failed.42
The combination of presidential promotion and judicial permissiveness
of school dress codes helped usher in the current era of pervasive dress
code policies. “In the two decades since the Clinton administration
encouraged American public schools to experiment with school uniforms
and strict dress codes, such restrictions have become a common—though
not quite omnipresent—feature of American public education.”43 Today, as
many as sixty percent of all public school students attend schools with strict
dress code policies, and another twenty-five percent wear school
uniforms.44 Restrictions on, severity of, and legislative authorization to
enforce dress codes vary widely across the country. At least twenty-two
states expressly grant local school districts the power to establish dress
codes, while school districts in other states do so with the tacit consent of
the state.45 Some states, like Arkansas, have state-wide public school dress
codes, portions of which specifically target only students with female
anatomy.46
These dress restrictive policies have faced several narrow legal
challenges, but the few broad constitutional challenges “have run into a
wall of judicial skepticism and have been rejected nearly uniformly, often
without thorough consideration.”47 While many lower courts have rejected
the Supreme Court’s early formulations that dress itself has protected
expressive value, even courts willing to entertain free expression claims
rarely require schools to provide support for their proffered justifications
that dress policies are necessary.48 Particularly problematic, in the hyper42. See infra Part III.
43. Ahrens & Siegel, supra note 7, at 61.
44. Id.; see also infra note 46.
45. See Zhou, supra note 4; see also Jocelyn Gecker, California City Is Latest to Redo
“Sexist” School Dress Code, CBS DENVER (Sept. 19, 2018, 9:56 AM),
https://denver.cbslocal.com/2018/09/19/sexist-dress-code-half-shirts-school/ (“Dress codes
and their severity vary widely nationwide. Twenty-four states have policies that give local
school districts the power to adopt their own dress codes or uniform policies, according to
the Education Commission of the States, a nonprofit that tracks education policy.”).
46. Gecker, supra note 45 (explaining that Arkansas’ statewide policy requires districts
“to prohibit the wearing of clothing that exposes underwear, buttocks, or the breast of a
female”).
47. Ahrens & Siegel, supra note 7, at 62.
48. Id. at 63; see also Blau v. Fort Thomas Pub. Sch. Dist., 401 F.3d 381, 388 (6th Cir.
2005) (rejecting claim that clothing itself has any expressive content for First Amendment
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sexualized gendered dress code context, courts rarely treat a district’s “lack
of distraction” justification as anything other than self-evidently weighty,49
or deserving of substantial deference as a matter of order, discipline, and
pedagogy.50
While the explicit enforcement of dress codes spans only a few decades,
its recent addition to the school regulatory machinery springs from wellentrenched and antiquated notions of feminine acquiescence to white, male,
heteronormative, and inherently conservative uniformity. Originally
justified as tools to create safe learning environments free from violence
and distractions, these policies have more sinisterly manifested a
fascination on gender in minor students.
III. The Growing Obsession with Sex: Gendered
(and “Gender Neutral”) Dress Codes
“While research on dress codes remains inconclusive regarding the
correlation between their implementation with students’ academic
outcomes, many educators agree that they can serve an important purpose:
helping insure a safe and comfortable learning environment . . . .”51
Banning clearly disruptive attire like T-shirts with racial epithets or explicit
language, or physically disruptive clothing like hats with built-in strobe
lighting, promotes a productive learning environment by avoiding material
and substantial disruptions.52
But what is offensive and inappropriate? That answer can be difficult
even with arguably racist symbols such as Confederate flags or “MAGA”

purposes unless the clothing “‘conveys a particular[ ] message’”) (quoting Spence v.
Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 411 (1974))); Inturri v. City of Hartford, 365 F. Supp. 2d 240,
245 (D. Conn. 2005) (observing plaintiffs’ concession that “their spider web tattoos are not
conveying any speech or message, but merely are related to personal appearance”).
49. See, e.g., Blau, 401 F.3d at 397–98 (listing arguments in support of student dress
restrictions and treating them as largely self-evident); Littlefield v. Forney Indep. Sch. Dist.,
268 F.3d 275, 286 (5th Cir. 2001) (“Improving the educational process is undoubtedly an
important and substantial interest of Forney and the school board.”).
50. See, e.g., Littlefield, 268 F.3d at 287 (“As has been well recognized, federal courts
should defer to school boards to decide, within constitutional bounds, what constitutes
appropriate behavior and dress in public schools.”).
51. Zhou, supra note 4; see also EDUC. P’SHIPS, INC., RESEARCH BRIEF: STUDENT DRESS
CODES AND UNIFORMS (2009), https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED537953.pdf.
52. Zhou, supra note 4.
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hats.53 Moreover, the answer becomes much more subjective when one
considers the “offensiveness” not of language but of one’s own body.
Nevertheless, in recent years, supporters of strict public school dress
restrictions have focused heavily on the “disruption” caused by the
adolescent female body.54 Some argue that this increased focus derives
from “complicated trends in sexuality and gender relations that have
sexualized young women and girls of an ever-decreasing age.”55 But dress
codes labeling girls’ bodies as “disruptive” because of their inherently
sexual nature does the opposite of preventing sexualization, particularly
when the codes punish those same young people for the power and dangers
supposedly implicit in that imputed sexuality.56
Numerous scholars have convincingly explained how media, advertising,
and other influences have pressed upon both young women and men of all
ages an inherently sexualized account of female adolescence.57 Some, like
mass advertising critic Jean Kilbourne, have used this reality to justify strict
“modesty-based” dress code bans.58 Kilbourne, author of the book So Sexy
So Soon: The New Sexualized Childhood, has expressed the view that
school dress codes help “take away some of the pressures that girls feel to
don sexy outfits.”59
53. Dave Urbanski, Law Professor Blasts Student’s MAGA Hat as “Undeniable Symbol
of White Supremacy,” BLAZE (July 10, 2019), https://www.theblaze.com/news/lawprofessor-blasts-students-maga-hat-as-undeniable-symbol-of-white-supremacy
(quoting
professor Jeffrey Omari, who claimed that a student’s “shiny red MAGA hat was like a siren
spewing derogatory racial obscenities at me for the duration of the one hour and fifteenminute class”).
54. Hayley Krischer, Is Your Body Appropriate to Wear to School?, NY TIMES (Apr. 17,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/17/style/student-bra-nipples-school.html (recounting
story of female high school student who declined to wear a bra to school because of a
painful sunburn she suffered and who was forced by the administration to place Band-Aids
on her nipples to remove any distraction her body might cause to other students).
55. Ahrens & Siegel, supra note 7, at 76; see also Harbach, supra note 8, at 1044
(suggesting that educators believe that simply obscuring the female body will diffuse sexual
tension).
56. Zhou, supra note 4 (“[O]ne of the key concerns is the implication that women
should be hypercognizant about their physical identity and how the world responds to it.”);
Harbach, supra note 8, at 1044.
57. See Harbach, supra note 8, at 1042.
58. See generally DIANE E. LEVIN & JEAN KILBOURNE, SO SEXY SO SOON: THE NEW
SEXUALIZED CHILDHOOD AND WHAT PARENTS CAN DO TO PROTECT THEIR KIDS (2008).
59. Ellen Friedrichs, 4 Lies About School Dress Codes That Cover Up Their Oppressive
Effects, EVERYDAY FEMINISM (Dec. 11, 2014), https://everydayfeminism.com/2014/
12/school-dress-code-myths/ (“As [Kilbourne] said in an interview on the matter, ‘Girls
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But imposing modesty-based dress restrictions on female students often
is counterproductive. In fact, in many ways, such dress codes are actively
harmful in institutionalizing myths about a girl’s inherent sexuality, the
dangerousness of her body, and her responsibility to protect others from
their own lurid sexual stares and advances. This harmful messaging
reinforces the consent myth that provocative dress implies consent to be
objectified, or worse.
A. Obsessing Over Sex
What Ms. Kilbourne and others promoting this pseudo-protective
justification for dress codes often miss is that the enforcement of the dress
code itself unnecessarily and harmfully injects sexualization into an
otherwise innocent school day. In 2015, an elementary school in Houston
sent home a five-year-old kindergarten student for wearing her favorite
rainbow dress “‘because spaghetti straps are against the rules.’”60 This
admittedly extreme example nevertheless highlights several problems with
sex-obsessed dress codes. First, the facially gender neutral dress code at
issue contained several provisions targeting clothing only sold for and worn
by those who identify as female: Shirts could not expose the chest,
midsection, or torso;61 skirts and sun dresses needed to be kept at mid-thigh
length or longer;62 and cleavage and bra straps could not be shown.63
Second, it defies common sense to suggest that a five-year-old girl’s
sundress exposing her shoulders could possibly cause a “material and
substantial disruption” to her classmates, most of whom are at least a
decade away from becoming sexually mature and active. Instead, the
enforcement of this implicitly gendered dress code required an adult
administrator charged with protecting elementary school students to
sexualize a five-year-old girl and remove her from her educational
experience as a result.

these days are really pressured to dress in a very provocative way. All of their role models –
celebrities and pop stars – dress that way. For them, sexy and attractive is defined in a very
cliched and stereotypical way.’”).
60. Jef Rouner, The Apparently Immoral Shoulders of My Five-Year-Old Daughter,
HOUS. PRESS (Apr. 22, 2015, 6:00 AM), https://www.houstonpress.com/arts/the-apparentlyimmoral-shoulders-of-my-five-year-old-daughter-7372634.
61. CYPRESS-FAIRBANKS I.S.D., STUDENT HANDBOOK: 2019-2020, at 44 (2019),
http://www.cfisd.net/download_file/517811526.
62. Id.
63. Id.
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Third, enforcing this dress code violation forced the parents of a fiveyear-old girl to decide whether to have an honest yet premature
conversation about sex and objectification of womens’ bodies or mislead
their daughter when she asks why she had to leave school. This unnecessary
injection of sex was only made possible because dress codes like those
promoted by Ms. Kilbourne—ones purportedly designed to protect girls
from sexual objectification—exist.64
B. Consent Implications of Modesty-Based Dress Codes
Gender-based critiques of school dress codes focus not only on explicitly
gendered differences in such codes, but also on facially neutral codes that
have a disproportionate impact on female students. These critiques draw
public attention to the fact that most of the restrictions in public school
dress codes apply exclusively or disproportionately to female attire.65 The
stated (and implicit) purposes of these dress codes, the objectification of
girls’ bodies required to enforce the codes, and the harmful disproportionate
impact of these codes entrench and institutionalize myths around female
body ownership and sexual consent at a dangerously young age.
1. Stated and Implicit Purposes of Sex-Obsessed Dress Codes
Modesty-based dress codes reinforce the message that girls’ bodies are
inherently dangerous to men and boys, and that they are responsible for any
unwanted attention they receive. Gendered dress codes ask girls “to curtail
their self-expression not for their own benefit but for the benefit of young

64. One particularly offensive Pennsylvania high school dress code reflects the failure
of the strict dress code system to protect girls:
Ladies:
....
. . . Choose modest attire. No bellies showing, keep “the girls” covered and
supported, and make sure that nothing is so small that all your bits and pieces
are hanging out. Please remember as you select an outfit . . . that we don’t want
to be looking at “sausage rolls” . . . . As you get dressed, remember that you
can’t put 10 pounds of mud in a five-pound sack.
Taylor Pittman, High School Dress Code Letter Advises Girls to Cover Their “Sausage
Rolls,” HUFFPOST (May 29, 2015, 1:26 PM ET), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/biglervillehigh-school-dress-code-sausage-rolls_n_7463576.
65. Zhou, supra note 4; see also Galen Sherwin, 5 Things Public Schools Can and
Can’t Do When It Comes to Dress Codes, ACLU (May 30, 2017, 4:00 PM),
https://www.aclu.org/blog/womens-rights/womens-rights-education/5-things-public-schoolscan-and-cant-do-when-it-comes.
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men who are allegedly distracted by sharing public space with women.”66
This “lack of distraction” rationale—that the uncovered bodies of female
students are so disruptive that they impede male students’ ability to learn—
has been repeated numerous times by school administrators defending these
codes.67 As one high school student told a reporter in 2017, “My principal
constantly says that the main reason for it is to create a ‘distraction-free
learning zone’ for our male counterparts.”68
Even more troubling than the rationale itself, administrators fault not the
male student who gazed sexually at a classmate and failed to pay attention
in class; instead, “the girl he was distracted by holds all the
responsibility.”69 This messaging—that girls are responsible for the lurid
and sexual temptations of boys—institutionalizes the corrosive notion that
girls’ “bodies are always sexualized and bad, and that they must cover them
up to appear decent.”70 It diminishes and shames a part of someone’s
personhood—the body—of which growing girls and boys should be proud,
teaching girls that, to at least half of the world’s population, their bodies are
both (1) dangerous, and (2) the only thing most men and boys see.71

66. Ahrens & Siegel, supra note 7, at 99.
67. Emily Miller, Dress Code Sexism, HER CAMPUS (Apr. 24, 2017, 11:50 PM),
https://www.hercampus.com/school/akron/dress-code-sexism (“Dress codes are enforced for
the comfort and ‘lack of distraction’ for male students. Girl[s’] bodies apparently pose an
inconvenience for the teenage boy. If not properly covered, a male student might become so
entranced with a female student’s shoulder that he could completely miss out on all the
information in class. And whose fault is that? According to schools, the girl he was
distracted by holds all the responsibility.”).
68. Zhou, supra note 4 (“[A] group of high-school girls from South Orange, New
Jersey . . . launched a campaign last fall, #IAmMoreThanADistraction, which exploded into
a trending topic on Twitter and gleaned thousands of responses from girls sharing their own
experiences.”).
69. Miller, supra note 67; see also Zhou, supra note 4 (“[M]any districts across the
country . . . justify female-specific rules with that logic, and effectively, . . . place the onus
on girls to prevent inappropriate reactions from their male classmates.”).
70. Miller, supra note 67; see also Catherine McCall, The Sexualization of Women and
Girls, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Mar. 4, 2012), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/
overcoming-child-abuse/201203/the-sexualization-women-and-girls
(explaining
the
psychological consequences of sexualizing girls in school).
71. Friedrichs, supra note 59 (“[A]ny confidence and pride she might take in her
appearance is automatically stripped from her when she is told that she is dressing
inappropriately.”); see also Zhou, supra note 4 (“‘The dress code makes girls feel selfconscious, ashamed, and uncomfortable in their own bodies.’”). And by placing blame on
the female student for tempting boys with their bodies, schools institutionalize the message
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Obsessing over girls’ bodies in student dress codes harmfully places the
focus on physical appearance over physical abilities, mental capabilities, or
emotional development, perpetuating the troubling message that women
exist for the consumption of society.72
“Educators and sociologists, too, have argued that dress codes grounded
in such logic amplify a broader societal expectation: that women are the
ones who need to protect themselves from unwanted attention and that
those wearing what could be considered sexy clothing are ‘asking for’ a
response.”73 One sociologist concluded that “dress codes normalize certain
forms of girlhood, problematize others, and suggest girls’ responsibility for
the school’s moral climate.”74
This rationale also communicates harmful and dangerous methods to
both boys and girls regarding consent. It tells boys that it is “the girl’s
responsibility to cover up, and if she doesn’t it’s her fault he got
distracted.”75 It gives carte blanche for boys to lean into the myth that “they
are incapable of controlling their own urges.”76 Conversely, it tells girls that
they are responsible for preventing this irresistible urge of the opposite sex,
and that it is their fault for dressing so provocatively if boys gaze, leer,
whistle, catcall, or touch. As one dress code critic noted, this approach
serves as a microcosm of “‘a culture that’s so used to looking at issues of
harassment and assault through the wrong end of the telescope,’” directed at
“‘girls’ own clothing’” rather than the kind of sexually predatory behavior
directed at girls.77 Or, as another critic put it more bluntly, “[r]ather than
teaching boys that looking up girls’ skirts is wrong—no matter how
that the only truly relevant part of the girl’s personhood is a dangerous weapon that must be
kept under wraps. Id.
72. Ahrens & Siegel, supra note 7, at 99 (contending that gendered dress codes tell girls
that “[t]heir permission to enter the public space is conditioned on acquiescence to a statesanctioned gaze that draws attention to their bodies and conceptualizes them as potential
sexual objects rather than equal members of a learning community”).
73. Zhou, supra note 4.
74. Friedrichs, supra note 59.
75. Miller, supra note 67.
76. Id.; see also Zhou, supra note 4 (“Often they report hearing phrases like, ‘boys will
be boys,’ from teachers.”); Mieke Eerkens, When Judges Assume That Men Cannot Control
Their Own Sexual Urges, ATLANTIC (July 17, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/
sexes/archive/2013/07/when-judges-assume-that-men-cannot-control-their-own-sexualurges/277880/ (recalling Iowa Supreme Court case upholding dismissal of female employee
because her male employer found her too irresistibly attractive).
77. Zhou, supra note 4.
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convenient the angle might be—they enforce a rule that punishes a high
school girl for being sexualized by her peers.”78
This distorted view of responsibility holds obvious and disturbing
parallels in criminal sexual assault cases. School dress codes tell girls that
their permission to enter public school is conditioned on an adult’s
determination that those around her can control themselves.79 And this
entire narrative reinforces scripts and assumptions about gender and
sexuality that misplace responsibility for sexual violence on its victims.80
2. Objectification and Enforcement
The enforcement of these modesty-based dress codes requires the literal
gaze of adult school officials (mostly male81) who are required to view
young women sexually in order to assess their compliance with dress
restrictions. In other words, dress codes designed to prevent sexualization
of girls require the very type of objectification the rules are purportedly
designed to prevent.82

78. Miller, supra note 67; see also Rebecca Klein, High School Student Accuses School
of “Shaming Girls for Their Bodies” With Dress Code, HUFFPOST (June 2, 2014, 1:52 PM
ET), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/lindsey-stocker-dress-code_n_5432687 (explaining
that one Quebec high school student hung a sign stating, “‘Don’t humiliate her because she
is wearing shorts. It’s hot outside. Instead of shaming girls for their bodies, teach boys that
girls are not sexual objects’”).
79. Friedrichs, supra note 59 (“[This view] assumes that the sexualization is the fault of
the girl, and not the person sexualizing her.”) Since “[a] teen may simply be trying to dress
fashionabl[y],” the fault ought to lie with the adult sexualizing her. Id.
80. See Miller, supra note 67 (“This plays right into rape culture. . . . What is a question
that is so commonly and despicably asked in rape cases? You guessed it: ‘What was she
wearing?’”).
81. Robert Maranto et al., Boys Will Be Superintendents: School Leadership as a
Gendered Profession, PHI DELTA KAPPAN (Sept. 24, 2018), https://kappanonline.org/
maranto-carroll-cheng-teodoro-school-leadership-gender/ (“[U]sing data on more than 7,500
public school principals from the U.S. Department of Education 2011-12 Schools and
Staffing Survey and additional published sources, we recently found that while 90% of
elementary teachers are women, only 66% of elementary principals are women. In secondary
schools, meanwhile, women make up 63% of teachers but just 48% of principals.”).
82. Friedrichs, supra note 59 (“Really, claiming that dress codes prevent ‘sexualization’
of girls seems more like a paternalistic excuse given by people who are uncomfortable
admitting that some teen girls may choose to express their sexuality through their
appearance, or by others who themselves draw sexual conclusions about teens in certain
outfits.”); see also Suzannah Weiss, 5 Ways School Dress Codes Reinforce Rape Culture,
Because Women Aren’t a “Distraction,” BUSTLE (Feb. 23, 2016), https://www.bustle.
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The enforcement of dress code violations by men through a
predominantly male lens as a result of predominantly male sexualization
parallels troublingly with the experience of criminal sexual assault victims.
Women reporting their own rapes and sexual assaults to police officers
regularly express frustration with the “credibility discount” they encounter
from predominantly male police officers in believing their stories.83 A 2016
Department of Justice report on the prosecution of sex crimes in the United
States found substantial and pervasive problems with male police officers
expressing skepticism about the veracity of rape allegations.84 In addition,
even when cases do make it to court, judges continue to express confusion
regarding consent.85
Just as male-centric enforcement of a minor female’s dress misplaces
responsibility for the sexualization of young girls and misrepresents the
notion of consent to sexual attention, criminal sexual assault adjudication
utilizes archaic societal attitudes about “sexual autonomy and gender roles
in sexual relations.”86 When school administrators communicate that girls
are responsible for any sexual attention they may receive from their
classmates or teachers, it should come as little surprise that “jurors,

com/articles/143604-5-ways-school-dress-codes-reinforce-rape-culture-because-womenarent-a-distraction.
83. Deborah Tuerkheimer, Incredible Women: Sexual Violence and the Credibility
Discount, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 33 (2017) (“The typical law enforcement investigation is
guilt-presumptive (and potentially problematic for that reason). In sexual assault cases, this
presumption is flipped.”).
84. Soraya Chemaly, How Police Still Fail Rape Victims, ROLLING STONE (Aug. 16,
2016, 8:29 PM ET), http://www.rollingstone.com/culture/features/how-police-still-fail-rapevictims-w434669 (“One officer in the [Baltimore P.D.] sex crimes unit explained, ‘In
homicide, there are real victims; all our rape cases are bullshit.’”).
85. See Shawn E. Fields, Debunking the Stranger-in-the-Bushes Myth: The Case for
Sexual Assault Protection Orders, 2017 WIS. L. REV. 429, 441 (2017) (recalling rape case in
which one judge asked a nineteen-year-old victim who was raped over a bathroom sink,
“Why couldn’t you just keep your knees together? . . . Why didn’t you just sink your bottom
down into the basin so he couldn’t penetrate you? . . . If you were frightened, you could have
screamed.”). “Judge Camp also wondered aloud during the trial ‘why she allowed the sex to
happen if she didn’t want it,’ and that ‘she certainly had the ability, perhaps learnt from her
experience on the streets, to tell (him) to f--- off.’” Id. (alterations in original).
86. Ilene Seidman & Susan Vickers, The Second Wave: An Agenda for the Next Thirty
Years of Rape Law Reform, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 467, 468 (2005).
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prosecutors and police are confused about the boundary line between sex
and rape.”87
3. The Disproportionate Impact on Female Students
Modesty-based dress codes subject young women “to more specific
limitations on their expression than young men. They are required to spend
more time and emotional energy on ensuring compliance with state
appearance standards than young men.”88 This reality tangibly harms girls’
educations at rates disproportionate to their male counterparts, and once
again communicates that girls and women are less deserving of the
resources available in the public domain than boys and men.
Consider the following common dress code provision: “Clothing and
accessories must not be disruptive to teaching and learning. . . . [N]o lowcut blouses, tube/halter tops, midriff tops. No short-shorts, mini-skirts. All
shorts/skirts must be at relaxed hand level. . . . No visible undergarments.”89
This facially neutral dress code restricts clothing in a way that functionally
affects only girls. “Boys shorts are made longer, their tank tops have thicker
straps, and they have no bra straps or cleavage to hide.”90
These gendered dress codes, even if facially neutral, have the effect of
“focus[ing] a disproportionate amount of female students’ attention on
policing their own appearance and sexuality.”91 At Tottenville High School
on Staten Island, a study found that its dress code banning clothes like tank
tops and mini-skirts led to over one hundred disciplinary actions per
month—with more than ninety percent of those actions taken against girls.92

87. Fields, supra note 85, at 441 (quoting Seidman & Vickers, supra note 86, at 468)
(“The vast majority of people—including law enforcement personnel, judges and potential
jurors—remain conflicted about what constitutes ‘consensual’ sex. They are ambivalent
about placing criminal sanctions on ‘non-violent’ sexual assault or, for that matter, anything
short of violent penetration that results in physical injuries.”).
88. Ahrens & Siegel, supra note 7, at 99; Miller, supra note 67 (“Policies are almost
always directed strictly toward girls; some even specify for girls only.”).
89. TOTTENVILLE HIGH SCH., FAMILY STUDENT HANDBOOK 32 (2014), https://web.
archive.org/web/20150322064140/http://www.tottenvillehs.net/www/ud00/6/6baff98e0b934
e299f3d3025021920bd/Personal_Documents/Family.Student%20Handbook%202014.pdf.
90. Miller, supra note 67 (“Dress codes are clearly written for girls. No one is
monitoring the length of any guy’s cargo shorts, but someone is always watching for a dress
that comes up a little too short.”).
91. Ahrens & Siegel, supra note 7, at 104.
92. Ryan Broderick, This High School’s “Sexist” Dress Code Has Caused 200
Detentions in Just the Last Two Weeks, BUZZFEED NEWS (Sept. 16, 2014, 12:50 PM ET),
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The disruption and humiliation attendant with enforcing these dress
codes also bear mention. “Frequently, students are openly called out in the
middle of class, told to leave and change, and sometimes, to go home and
find a more appropriate outfit. In some instances, girls must wear brightly
colored shirts that can exacerbate the embarrassment, emblazoned with
words like ‘Dress Code Violator.’”93 In short, “who has to dress a certain
way to make sure their body is covered? Who will be asked to change if
they don’t follow this rule? Who will be taken out of class or even sent
home if their clothes are deemed to be too distracting? Girls.”94
The purpose, enforcement, and disproportionate impact of modestybased dress codes all institutionalize harmful myths and stereotypes that
almost uniformly hurt young girls. “They are grounded in patriarchal
assumptions about the dangers of the female body [and] the primacy of
male claims to public space and services . . . .”95 They reinforce the false
narrative that women are responsible for protecting themselves and altering
their behavior to serve male interests, and they highlight the “state’s
unwillingness to take responsibility for protecting women from physical
and sexual assault.”96
C. Legal Challenges to Sex-Obsessed Dress Codes
While the primary purpose of this Article is not to lay groundwork for
new legal challenges to school dress, it bears reflecting on recent failed
attempts to challenge sex-obsessed dress codes on constitutional and Title
IX grounds. These failures, in the face of compelling arguments, reinforce
the unwillingness of state and federal district courts to take seriously the
threats to girls and women through patriarchal institutions like gendered
dress codes.
Broad-based challenges to dress codes have focused on substantive due
process rights to autonomy, First Amendment rights to free expression,

https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/ryanhatesthis/tottenville-high-school-dress-forsuccess.
93. Zhou, supra note 4 (“‘That’s crazy they’re caring more about two inches of a girl’s
thigh being shown than them being in class.’”).
94. Miller, supra note 67 (“Because a female student’s body might pose a distraction to
a male student’s education, her education is interrupted and put on hold until she can find
something more suitable for the classroom.”).
95. Ahrens & Siegel, supra note 7, at 104.
96. Id.
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Equal Protection challenges based on gender, and Title IX challenges as
applied to disruptions to female education.
1. Substantive Due Process
Modern substantive due process formulations consider the zone of
individual autonomy to which individuals deserve protection absent
overriding state justification. As decisions within the zone of autonomy
become more personal, important, and central to the development of
individual identity, government action requires a more substantial
justification. Some decisions, according to modern Supreme Court
jurisprudence, are made free from the “compulsion of the State.”97
The importance of dressing oneself as a decision worthy of constitutional
autonomous protection has undergone significant redefinition since Tinker.
While courts throughout the 1970s acknowledged the importance of dress
and presentation as a central component of individual liberty,98 more recent
decisions blithely refer to students’ right to “look nice” or wear clothes they
“feel good in.”99 For example, in a leading case from the Sixth Circuit, the
court trivialized a student’s substantive due process claim as resting on a
purported right to wear blue jeans rather than any truly important liberty
interest worthy of constitutional protection.100
This liberty interest, when framed so narrowly, is doomed to give way to
the admittedly important interest of public educators to provide a safe and
productive learning environment for the nation’s children. But the showing
required for this government justification has undergone radical
transformation since Tinker as well. As discussed previously, courts in the
immediate wake of Tinker read that decision as requiring an actual showing
by the government—through empirical evidence or otherwise—not only
that a proposed dress code action was rationally related to the stated
objective but actually did further that objective.101 This stringent
97. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (“At the heart of liberty is
the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the
mystery of life.”).
98. See, e.g., Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281, 1286 (1st Cir. 1970) (finding “within
the commodious concept of liberty” the right to “wear one’s hair as he wishes”) (“The
Founding Fathers wrote an amendment for speech and assembly; even they did not deem it
necessary to write an amendment for personal appearance.”).
99. Blau v. Fort Thomas Pub. Sch. Dist., 401 F.3d 381, 388–89 (6th Cir. 2005).
100. Id. at 389.
101. See, e.g., Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d 1069, 1075–76 (8th Cir. 1971) (rejecting
school dress code policy that was not necessary “to carry out the educational mission of . . .
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requirement led, at first, to judicial override of hair length codes, and later,
to the decline in school dress codes generally.102
Contemporary courts take a far different approach, accepting at face
value the bare assertions of schools that dress codes further the various
goals of order, discipline, safety, and fostering a productive learning
environment.103 While granting deference to the expertise of school
administrators in choosing how best to operate their schools may make
sense, limits to that deference must exist. Some less inherently problematic
dress code policies, such as prohibitions on clothing with cartoon
characters, may help foster a less distracting learning environment for
younger children. But courts should require at least a minimal showing that
such a prohibition is required. That scrutiny should be all the more exacting
when the policy at issue directly or indirectly affects a group of students on
the basis of sex or gender. Indeed, the entire body of our liberty-based due
process jurisprudence rests on the ability of the Court to probe the
importance of a stated government objective and the connection of that
objective to the challenged action. Those limits appear lacking in the school
dress code context.
2. First Amendment
Broad First Amendment challenges to school dress codes have also
failed, but for slightly different reasons. One reason concerns the ambiguity
in First Amendment jurisprudence itself regarding nonverbal expression.
First Amendment law recognizes that the freedom of expression
encompasses a wide variety of conduct intended to communicate political
and social ideas. Here, the conduct of “styling one’s appearance and
determining how to present oneself for public consumption in a public
school setting is inherently richly communicative.”104
the school”); see also Stevenson v. Bd. of Educ., 426 F.2d 1154, 1158 (5th Cir. 1970)
(upholding hair length restriction only after school provided evidence of disruption in the
classroom arising from hair length).
102. See Richards, 424 F.2d at 1286.
103. See Blau, 401 F.3d at 392 (upholding school dress code when only evidence
presented was “affidavits from three teachers who agreed that the dress code had a positive
impact on the Highlands learning environment”).
104. Ahrens & Siegel, supra note 7, at 102; see also G. Q. Vicary, The Signs of Clothing,
in CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES IN NONVERBAL COMMUNICATION 291, 299 (Fernando
Poyatos ed., 1988) (“Clothing is basic to definition of self. It is impossible to discuss
clothing, even as distant history, and ignore disquieting inner questions such as ‘what do the
clothes I am wearing say about me?’”).
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However, courts have expressed confusion over the extent to which the
First Amendment covers such generalized expression as “dress,” or whether
it covers it at all.105 As recently explained by academics,106 the source of the
confusion appears to be whether the type of nuanced messaging in selfstyling is itself a source for protection under the Free Speech Clause, or
whether the styling is merely connected to other values protected by the
First Amendment.107
To the extent courts have been forced to decide this issue, they have
uniformly rejected First Amendment challenges to broad dress codes. Much
of the reasoning appears again connected to the narrow framing of what
self-styling actually means to a child as a form of expression, which itself
renders it less deserving of protection in the face of countervailing
government objectives.108 It remains to be seen how the analysis might
change if a court with a more expansive view of the communicative nature
of dress faces this issue.
3. Equal Protection
Perhaps more relevant to the subject of this Article are gender-based
challenges under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Dress codes with explicitly gendered differences are
automatically suspect and require an “exceedingly persuasive justification”
to withstand constitutional challenge.109 These codes are subjected to the
Court’s intermediate scrutiny framework, requiring that the gender

105. See Ahrens & Siegel, supra note 7, at 103.
106. See generally MARK V. TUSHNET, ALAN K. CHEN & JOSEPH BLOCHER, FREE SPEECH
BEYOND WORDS: THE SURPRISING REACH OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (2017).
107. See id. at 34–41 (detailing these free speech arguments as related to instrumental
music, which is another form of nonverbal self-styling).
108. Blau, 401 F.3d at 391 (doubting whether the desire to dress oneself generally
garners First Amendment protection, but nonetheless rejecting the claim because of the
existence of “important governmental interests” such as “bridg[ing] socio-economic
differences between families,” “focus[ing] attention on learning,” [and] “enhanc[ing] school
safety”); Littlefield v. Forney Indep. Sch. Dist., 268 F.3d 275, 285–86 (5th Cir. 2001)
(assuming “without deciding that the First Amendment applies to expressive conduct
implicated in the mandatory Uniform Policy,” but upholding the policy because “improving
the educational process is undoubtedly an important and substantial interest”).
109. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 524 (1996) (holding that government
actions that facially classify on gender violate the Equal Protection Clause unless the
government can provide an “exceedingly persuasive justification” for gender-specific
action).
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classification (1) serve “important governmental objectives” and (2) be
“substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.”110
Many school dress codes—including those discussed in this Article—are
so poorly written and facially discriminatory that they would likely fail
under a straightforward application of this test. Indeed, the Supreme Court
has regularly expressed skepticism with “regulatory regimes that impose
broad, differential burdens on the civil participation of women . . . [and] for
the ad hoc justifications states use to rationalize such regimes.”111
Surprisingly few Equal Protection challenges have been brought against
explicitly gendered dress codes, but one such challenge recently succeeded
in North Carolina. In Peltier v. Charter Day School,112 three students sued a
charter school, challenging a policy that required girls to wear “skirts,
skorts, or jumpers” and prohibited them from wearing shorts or pants.113
The students argued that the policy “subject[ed] them to archaic stereotypes
about what constitutes appropriate behavior and conduct for girls.”114 In
turn, the students maintained that the code “reinforc[ed] the notion that
girls, but not boys, must dress and behave modestly, that they are less
physically active than boys and that they should behave and dress in a
manner that is otherwise traditionally considered appropriately
feminine.”115
The court observed that “the caselaw in this specific area is not well
developed,” acknowledging that most “dress code cases are claims based on
the First Amendment.”116 Further, the court acknowledged that “[c]ourts
traditionally have and should refrain from regulating the day-to-day issues
presented in local schools.”117 However, the court ultimately found that the
skirt requirement violated the Equal Protection Clause:
110. See Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 60 (2001); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197
(1976).
111. Ahrens & Siegel, supra note 7, at 104; see Virginia, 518 U.S. at 557 (“Virginia . . .
has closed [VMI] to its daughters and, instead, has devised for them a ‘parallel program’
with faculty less impressively credentialed and less well paid, more limited course offerings,
fewer opportunities for military training and for scientific specialization.”).
112. 384 F. Supp. 3d 579 (E.D.N.C. 2019).
113. Id. at 584.
114. Erin Buzuvis, Title IX Dress Code Case Survives Motion to Dismiss, TITLE IX BLOG
(Apr. 4, 2017, 9:24 AM), https://title-ix.blogspot.com/2017/04/title-ix-dress-code-casesurvives.html (quoting complaint).
115. Id.
116. Peltier, 384 F. Supp. 3d at 595–96.
117. Id. at 595.
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While this court recognizes that certain sex-differentiated
standards consistent with community norms may be permissible,
the skirts requirement in this case is not consistent with
community norms. Women (and girls) have, for at least several
decades, routinely worn both pants and skirts in various settings,
including professional settings and school settings. Females have
been allowed to wear trousers or pants in all but the most formal
or conservative settings since the 1970s. . . . [M]ost public
school dress codes across the country allowed girls to wear pants
or shorts by the mid-1980s. . . . [C]ommunity standards which
may account for the differences in standards applied to men and
women, girls and boys, do not remain fixed in perpetuity.
While defendants argue the skirts requirement is based on the
traditional values approach of the school as a whole and is in
place to instill discipline and keep order, defendants have shown
no connection between these stated goals and the requirement
that girls wear skirts.118
This hopeful ruling certainly represents a step in the right direction, but it
also rested on the explicitly gendered nature of the dress code. Most school
dress codes are facially neutral as to gender, even if they work in form and
function to target and are disproportionately enforced against girls. Lacking
explicit discrimination, any Equal Protection challenge will require proof of
purposeful sex discrimination to succeed.119 That evidentiary showing is
difficult, complicated, and in the area of sex discrimination, rarely
successful.120

118. Id. at 596.
119. See Pers. Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 274–75 (1979) (analogizing racediscrimination cases to find that a law having a disparate impact on a historically
disadvantaged gender group did not violate the constitution absent a showing of purposeful
discrimination).
120. See Mary Anne Case, The Very Stereotype the Law Condemns: Constitutional Sex
Discrimination Law as a Quest for Perfect Proxies, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1447, 1466 (1999);
see also Long v. Bd. of Educ., 121 F. Supp. 2d 621, 627–28 (W.D. Ky. 2000) (subjecting the
school’s imposition of a sex-neutral, uniform-type dress code to the Feeney test and finding
the code was rationally related to the legitimate purpose of ensuring student safety and
fostering school order).
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4. Title IX
Absent evidence of purposeful sex discrimination, Title IX claims
against facially neutral school dress codes could, theoretically, provide
relief. Title IX provides: “No person . . . shall, on the basis of sex, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance.”121 Unlike Equal Protection challenges to facially
neutral government action, plaintiffs bringing Title IX claims can “show[ ]
that a facially neutral practice has a disparate impact” to carry their prima
facie burden.122 However, the government can rebut that prima facie
showing “by proving a business or educational necessity for the practice,”
which may foreclose relief for plaintiffs suing school districts in courts that
grant substantial deference to amorphous justifications such as order,
discipline, and preventing distractions.123
The larger hurdle, at least currently, appears to be the Department of
Education. In Peltier, the same court that granted plaintiffs summary
judgment on their Equal Protection claim granted defendants summary
judgment on their Title IX claim.124 In doing so, the court cited recent
administrative guidance from the Department of Education that Title IX
permits “issues involving codes of personal appearance [to] be resolved at
the local level.”125 It is important to note, however, that this setback came in
a case bringing a facial challenge to a gendered dress code. As empirical
evidence such as that highlighted in this Article becomes more prevalent
regarding the disproportionately adverse impacts such dress codes have on
female education, an as-applied challenge in the Title IX context may have
greater chances of success in the future.

121. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2018).
122. Jeldness v. Pearce, 30 F.3d 1220, 1229–30 (9th Cir. 1994).
123. Id.
124. Peltier v. Charter Day School, 384 F. Supp. 2d 579, 590 (E.D.N.C. 2019).
125. Id. at 589–90 (internal quotation omitted) (“Title IX does not directly speak to the
‘precise question’ of school uniform policies or appearance codes, suggesting that Congress
left this matter to the agency’s discretion. Additionally, in thirty-five years, Congress has
never overridden ED’s interpretation of the statute. ED has provided an answer, interpreting
Title IX to ‘permit[] issues involving codes of personal appearance to be resolved at the
local level.’”).
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IV. Institutions, Messaging, and Consent
The foregoing discussion highlights the parallels between the shaming
and victim-blaming central to enforcement of sexualized dress code policies
and the shaming and victim-blaming so often central to rape and sexual
assault adjudications. Just as a girl’s choice of clothing is scrutinized for
sexual communication to those around her in determining whether she has
invited “distracting” attention, a sexual violence victim’s clothing is
scrutinized for sexual communication to the perpetrator to determine
whether she impliedly invited the altercation. This is evident by the
question “what was she wearing?”, which remains a part of the defense
attorney’s lexicon in rape cases, and one can hardly blame the attorney
when judges and juries remain persuaded that a rape victim’s fashion
choices are relevant to the issue of consent.126
This concluding Part explores the implications of that parallel more
directly with respect to certain pervasive, troubling myths in criminal
sexual assault adjudication: (A) the notion of implied general consent to
sexual activity (or, framed differently, the false narrative of “worthiness” in
prosecution); (B) the myth of the perfect victim; and (C) the myth of the
unstoppable male.
A. Implied General Consent to Sexual Contact
Many modesty-based dress code critics observe that girls often wear
short skirts or spaghetti straps simply to stay cool or because the clothing is
fashionable, not to appear sexy.127 Undoubtedly, that is true. But one should
ask a more basic question here: what if high school girls want to feel and
look sexy? What, exactly, is wrong with that level of self-expression and
agency? If we want girls (and boys) to be confident in their own skin, to
feel proud of their own identities and individuality, to have positive body
images, then what precisely is inappropriate about a girl choosing to feel
and look sexy?

126. Hannah Brenner, Kathleen Darcy, Gina Fedock & Sheryl Kubiak, Bars to Justice:
The Impact of Rape Myths on Women in Prison, 17 GEO J. GENDER & L. 521, 540 (2016)
(explaining that questions designed to perpetuate the rape myth that a woman was “asking
for it” based on her behavior include “Was she drinking alcohol or using drugs at the time of
the assault?” “What was she wearing?” and “Was she walking alone?”).
127. Klein, supra note 78 (showing picture of a makeshift sign posted outside of a school
classroom, stating in part, “It’s hot outside. Instead of shaming girls for their bodies, teach
boys that girls are not sexual objects.”).
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The answer, apparently, is that expressing oneself sexually may attract
attention, for which the one expressing herself must be held accountable.
Rather than acknowledging that a girl can dress how she wants and others
are responsible for their own responses, schools preemptively shut down
that form of confident self-expression because other people may respond
inappropriately.128
To put a finer point on it, a school-age girl may in fact want to dress
provocatively to attract attention from a particular person, be it a boyfriend
or girlfriend, or simply a love interest. Inviting a consensual response from
that singular individual, however, does not mean that she has granted
general consent to all people in the public sphere. Dressing oneself is the
responsibility of that person; the response to that dress is everyone else’s
responsibility, and nothing about the nature of one’s dress does or can grant
implied general consent to make sexual advances.
Likewise, a woman has every right to dress provocatively (i.e., “don sexy
outfits”129) in public with the purpose of attracting attention and, perhaps, a
sexual companion. Her clothing may even communicate that desire, as
dress is inherently communicative and expressive.130 But just because the
general public can see that communication does not mean the person
wearing those clothes has granted implied general consent for all to make
sexual advances. So often lacking in public discourse around dress and
consent is the basic fundamental recognition that a person’s dress cannot,
by itself, communicate consent for anyone to do anything. There simply
exists no general implied consent to engage sexually or otherwise with a
sexily dressed woman. Neither does there exist any specific implied consent
for a particular person to engage sexually with a sexily dressed woman,
even if that woman has consented to converse or otherwise interact with
that person.131
These basic premises should be noncontroversial; as formulated, they
likely are. But they also contradict the messaging behind placing
responsibility on the girl to dress modestly, lest she arouse a response from
128. See supra Part II.
129. Friedrichs, supra note 59.
130. See Vicary, supra note 104, at 323.
131. Cf. H.M. Malm, The Ontological Status of Consent and Its Implications for the Law
on Rape, 2 LEGAL THEORY 147, 148 (1996) (exploring various societal understandings of
“implied” or “tacit” consent as “consent given by refraining from an act rather than
performing an act,” but admonishing against applying a sliding scale of tacit consent too
easily in high-stakes situations like rape).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2020

202

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:173

a boy. That messaging institutionalizes the notion that, even if the girl who
wore short shorts did not specifically want boys to stare at her and make
lewd comments, she impliedly “asked for it” because she “should have
known better” than to dress that way. Similarly, when a rape investigation
focuses on whether the victim’s dress was “too provocative”—or, for that
matter, whether she was “out too late,”132 “in the wrong part of town,”133 or
too “intoxicated”134—it communicates that she impliedly “asked for it”
because she “should have known better.”135
Therefore, to disrupt the notion that it is proper to project general implied
consent onto any individual based on how they are dressed, reformers must
look to the source of this belief—early-life modesty-focused dress codes—
and rectify the message it sends.
B. The Perfect Victim
At its core, these victim-blaming messages communicate a societal
judgment that girls and women who behave in a certain way are less
deserving of protection from sexual violence because they engage in
behavior of which we disapprove. Some express this disapproval through
the lens of burden sharing and risk prevention.136 Women ought to take
132. Jessica Valenti, In Rape Tragedies, the Shame Is Ours, NATION (Apr. 17, 2013),
https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/rape-tragedies-shame-ours/ (“[W]henever we
blame a woman for being attacked—when we speculate about what she was wearing,
suggest she shouldn't have been drinking or that she stayed out too late—we’re making the
world safer for rapists.”).
133. SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN, AND RAPE 254–55
(1975) (“Women have been raped by men . . . for behavior no more provocative than
walking down the wrong road at night in the wrong part of town . . . .”).
134. Valenti, supra note 132.
135. State v. Neal, 120 P.3d 366, 374 (Kan. Ct. App. 2005) (summarizing trial court
transcript in rape case in which defense counsel wondered aloud if rape victim “should have
known better when she was at the Kwik Shop, because by that time Patrick Neal was already
putting his hands on her”).
136. See, e.g., Jeannie Sclafani Rhee, Redressing for Success: The Liability of Hooters
Restaurant for Customer Harassment of Waitresses, 20 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 163, 167
(1997) (explaining a “risk acceptance theory of non-liability” for women who dress
provocatively and are later sexually harassed); Kelly C. Timmons, Hooters: Should There Be
an Assumption of Risk Defense to Some Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harassment
Claims, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1107, 1123–24 (1995) (suggesting that “dress[ing] provocatively”
demonstrates an assumption of risk that harassment might follow); cf. Joshua Burstein,
Testing the Strength of Title VII Sexual Harassment Protection: Can It Support a Hostile
Work Environment Claim Brought by a Nude Dancer, 24 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE
271, 307–08 (1998) (discussing consent-based defenses such as perceived “welcomeness”
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simple safety precautions (that men do not have to take), make smarter
decisions (expending mental energy not required of men), or not put
themselves “in the wrong place at the wrong time” (places and times that
are not off limits to men). In short, women ought to work diligently not to
get raped.137
This type of victim-blaming mentality derives from the myth of the
“perfect victim,”138 the pure, virginal, modest woman who did nothing to
stemming from nonverbal cues like dress).
137. See, e.g., Charlotte Hilton Andersen, How to Teach Girls How Not to Get Raped,
GREAT FITNESS EXPERIMENT (Jan. 10, 2013, 10:15 AM), http://www.thegreatfitness
experiment.com/2013/01/how-to-teach-girls-how-not-to-get-raped.html (describing a selfdefense class in a which the teacher told young girls to report any attempted assault or rape
“[b]ecause if you don't report it—what if your best friend comes walking along that same
path 2 weeks later and gets raped? If you don't report it then it's your fault if other girls get
hurt,” and offering suggestions for teaching prevention of sexual assault in ways that would
not shift responsibility to victims); KATHERINE ANNE ROIPHE, THE MORNING AFTER: SEX,
FEAR, AND FEMINISM ON CAMPUS 9 (1993) (describing the first week of college for a female
student, where “there are fliers and counselors and videotapes telling us how not to get AIDS
and how not to get raped, where not to wander and what signals not to send”); cf. Zerlina
Maxwell, Stop Telling Women How to Not Get Raped, EBONY (Jan. 14, 2012), https://www.
ebony.com/news/stop-telling-women-how-to-not-get-raped/ (“No more ad campaigns and
public service announcements targeted at women to teach them how to avoid rape. . . . We
need anti-rape campaigns that target young men and boys.”); Chris Linder, Telling Women
How Not to Get Raped Won’t Stop Sexual Violence on Campus, GUARDIAN (Aug. 2, 2018,
2:30 PM EDT), https://www.theguardian.com/higher-education-network/2018/aug/02/
telling-women-how-not-to-get-raped-wont-stop-sexual-violence-on-campus (recommending
that universities shift focus from sobering statistics about how many women are sexually
assaulted and “teaching [those] women how not to get raped” to the fact that “one in 10 men
studying at university have committed sexual violence” and “teaching [those] perpetrators
not to rape”).
138. This use of the phrase “perfect victim” does not refer to the mythical “perfect rape
victim” who responds to unwanted sexual advances in the manner preferred by judges and
juries—by screaming, offering forcible physical and verbal resistance, and by immediately
calling the police and submitting to a medical examination. See Kelly Alison Behre,
Ensuring Choice and Voice for Campus Sexual Assault Victims: A Call for Victims’
Attorneys, 65 DRAKE L. REV. 293, 352 (2017) (describing the “harmful rape myth . . . of ‘the
perfect victim,’ promoting the idea that real victims of sexual assault respond to trauma in
one uniform manner”). As used here, the phrase also does not include a “perfect victim”
from the perspective of the perpetrator to identify and target vulnerable individuals for
predation. It is poignant, and perhaps ironic, however, that often perpetrators identify
“perfect victims” in part based on the target’s perceived credibility issues. See People v.
Fortson, 421 P.3d 1236, 1253 (Colo. App. 2018) (Berger, J., concurring) (discussing expert
testimony at a child sexual assault trial describing the “perfect victim” as one with
“developmental or credibility issues, [who is] thus less likely to be believed”).
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provoke or invite her attack, and who is thus morally blameless.139 Despite
the #MeToo Movement’s attempts to direct attention to the nuances of
sexual assault, and particularly the nuances of victim responses in
vulnerable, coercive settings, society still identifies “the image of the
‘victim’ [as] a blameless, pure stereotype, with whom all can identify.”140 A
“victim” is “an elderly person robbed of her life savings, an ‘innocent
bystander’ injured or killed during a holdup, or a brutally ravaged rape
victim. ‘Victims’ are not prostitutes beaten senseless . . . drug addicts
mugged and robbed . . . or misdemeanants raped by cellmates.”141
The moral superiority expressed against these “imperfect victims” of
crimes exists in the messaging institutionalized in modesty-based dress
codes. A girl who wears a short skirt may very well fall victim to boys
attempting to look up it, which is a form of sexual predation. But according
to school administrators, she is not a perfect victim or innocent bystander
because of her morally questionable choices; as such, she will receive
discipline rather than protection.142 Only this kind of sexist moral purity test
can explain why in one high school a girl was “dress coded . . . for wearing
shorts” just as a male classmate walked by wearing a T-shirt graphically
depicting a sex act with the phrase “good girls swallow” emblazoned across
the front.143 The boy received no punishment.144
The fallacy of the “perfect victim” is thus both factually flawed and
fundamentally dangerous. Nothing exists in our criminal law to provide
139. See Martha Chamallas, Lucky: The Sequel, 80 IND. L.J. 441, 442 (2005) (describing
the mythical “‘perfect’ [rape] victim, who is young, white, and a virgin”); see also Brenner
et al., supra note 126, at 540 (“Rape myths inform the ‘ideal victimhood’ requirement that a
victim be ‘carrying out a respectable project’ and is ‘not to be blamed.’”).
140. Lynne N. Henderson, The Wrongs of Victim’s Rights, 37 STAN. L. REV. 937, 951
(1985).
141. Id.
142. See Miller, supra note 67 (quoting school officials who “sent home 70 students for
the way they were dressed. Girls who wore skirts that were ‘too short’ . . . were sent
home . . . [because] boys would be able to ‘peer up the girl’s skirts while they climbed the
stairs’ . . . [instead of] teaching boys that looking up girl[s’] skirts is wrong—no matter how
convenient the angle might be—they enforce a rule that punishes a high school girl for being
sexualized by her peers.”).
143. Laura Bates, How School Dress Codes Shame Girls and Perpetuate Rape Culture,
TIME (May 22, 2015, 8:00 AM EDT), https://time.com/3892965/everydaysexism-schooldress-codes-rape-culture/ (“‘I walked past another student wearing a shirt depicting two stick
figures: the male holding down the female[’]s head in his crotch and saying “good girls
swallow.” Teachers walked right past him and didn’t say a thing.’”).
144. Id.
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sliding scale protection for victims of rape or sexual assault based on the
perceived moral innocence of the victim. Yet the perpetuation of the myth
that only virginal, modest girls and women can be raped creates license for
the very types of modesty-based and shame-based regulations reinforcing a
culture of impunity for predatory behavior.
C. The Unstoppable Male
School administrators place the onus on girls to cover up their bodies,
because boys “simply cannot help themselves,” “cannot resist the
temptation,” or “simply cannot resist the urge” to make unwanted sexual
advances. These dangerous claims take the “boys will be boys” trope a step
further by claiming an instinctual, primal urge within boys to sexualize girls
absolves boys from responsibility when they do so.145
Absolving boys from responsibility, or at least mitigating their
culpability, finds parallels in criminal sexual assault adjudication as well.
Even if a factfinder refuses to imply consent to engage in a sexual act from
the victim’s provocative dress, it may nevertheless mitigate the punishment
imposed because it is “reasonable” or “understandable” for the perpetrator
to behave the way he did given the primal irresistibility of the situation.
This approach represents a subtle reframing of the “perfect victim” myth.
Instead of concluding that a scantily clad rape victim is less deserving of
society’s protection, the factfinder concludes that the rape perpetrator is less
deserving of society’s condemnation because of his innate primal desire to
have sexual contact with a scantily clad female.146
This “primal urge” theory finds currency in another, perhaps less clearly
analogous set of cases: revoked consent or “post-penetration rape” cases.147
Until 2003, no state recognized a revocation of consent as valid once a sex

145. Linda R. Hirshman, Was There Sex Before Calvin Klein, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
929, 937 (1996) (“Sociobiologists would say that nothing is to be done. Boys will be boys;
they will rape and pillage and abandon their offspring. . . . Boys will be boys, unless women
will be slaves.”).
146. Christine Chambers Goodman, Protecting the Party Girl: A New Approach for
Evaluating Intoxicated Consent, 2009 B.Y.U. L. REV. 57, 95–96 (“In evaluating the
reasonableness of expressions of dissent . . . ‘we need to know the baseline of the person to
judge when a state of affairs is an evil or benefit for them’ to help us decide whether silence
should constitute consent.”).
147. See generally Amanda O. Davis, Comment, Clarifying the Issue of Consent: The
Evolution of Post-Penetration Rape Law, 34 STETSON L. REV. 729 (2005).
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act began.148 In other words, once a consensual act of sexual intercourse
began, neither party had a legal right to change their mind and stop the
act.149 Female victims bringing rape charges against men who ignored their
post-penetration revocations of consent were regularly met with the
“uncontrollable male” defense, articulated by the defendant in In re John Z:
By essence of the act of sexual intercourse, a male’s primal urge
to reproduce is aroused. It is therefore unreasonable for a female
and the law to expect a male to cease having sexual intercourse
immediately upon withdrawal of consent. It is only natural, fair
and just that a male be given a reasonable amount of time in
which to quell his primal urge . . . .150
Citing this “myth of the unstoppable male,” “the defendant disclaimed
both control over and responsibility for his actions, and denied legal
culpability for imposing sex on an unwilling partner.”151 This defense
claims that men, “by their very natures, would be biologically incapable of
abiding by a law that required them to listen and respond when their
partners withdrew consent for sex.”152 While the California Supreme Court
ultimately ruled against the perpetrator, it left the “unstoppable male” myth
intact, holding instead that the perpetrator had “ample time” to quell his
desires.153 Fortunately, following the outcry from this case and a growing
recognition of the need to fix this crazy loophole, states began enacting
statutes expressly making post-penetration rape a crime.154 Currently, only
148. Erin G. Palmer, Recent Development, Antiquated Notions of Womanhood and the
Myth of the Unstoppable Male: Why Post-Penetration Rape Cases Should Be a Crime in
North Carolina, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1258, 1277 (2004) (“[O]n July 25, 2003, [Illinois] became
the first state to enact a statute expressly making post-penetration rape a crime.”).
149. See, e.g., Battle v. State, 414 A.2d 1266, 1270 (Md. 1980) (“[I]f th[e] consent is
withdrawn prior to the act of penetration, then it cannot be said that she has consented to
sexual intercourse. On the other hand, ordinarily if she consents prior to penetration and
withdraws consent following penetration, there is no rape.”).
150. 60 P.3d 183, 187 (Cal. 2003).
151. Palmer, supra note 148, at 1276.
152. Id.
153. In re John Z, 60 P.3d at 187.
154. Mary Huff, The “New” Withdrawal of Consent Standard in Maryland Rape Law: A
Year After Baby v. State, MODERN AM., Fall 2009, at 14, 15 (vol. 5, no. 2), https://digital
commons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1024&context=tma
(describing
pace of legislative and judicial progress across the country); Molly Redden, ‘No Doesn’t
Really Mean No’: North Carolina Law Means Women Can’t Revoke Consent for Sex,
GUARDIAN (June 24, 2017, 7:00 AM EDT), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/
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North Carolina fails to recognize the validity of post-penetration consent
revocation.155
Admittedly, a boy leering at a girl’s body in school after being told to
stop differs significantly from a man continuing to have sex with a woman
after being told to stop. But the myth justifying diminished culpability in
both situations is similar: boys and men have primal urges to sexualize and
have sex with girls and women, they biologically cannot be expected to
resist these urges, and thus legally they will not be held fully responsible for
their nonconsensual actions. This male-centric, hetero-normative
accommodation is insulting to men and does incredible harm to women,
and yet finds a home in school policies governing our children.
V. Conclusion
Stephanie Hughes, the Woodford High School student pictured at the
beginning of this Article, missed hours of instruction waiting in the
principal’s office for her mother to leave work and bring clothing to cover
her exposed collarbone.156 Her mother gave her the scarf pictured below,
which brought Stephanie into compliance with the school’s dress code (see
Figure 2).157
However, the principal deemed the scarf “inappropriate” attire for school
and sent Stephanie home for the rest of the day.158 This episode led to
widespread protests at the school, eventually culminating in the creation of
a documentary by one of Stephanie’s classmates entitled Shame: A
Documentary on School Dress Code.159 The outcry over Woodford High’s
policies, and the documentary itself, helped place greater pressure on public

2017/jun/24/north-carolina-rape-legal-loophole-consent-state-v-way (explaining that North
Carolina law “prevented prosecutors from charging” rape in post-penetration withdrawal of
consent cases and state senator Jeff Jackson failed in his efforts to introduce legislation to fix
this “loophole”).
155. Redden, supra note 154 (quoting Senator Jackson) (“North Carolina is the only state
in the country where no doesn’t really mean no. We have a clear ethical obligation to fix this
obvious defect in our rape law.”).
156. Lewis, supra note 1.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
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schools across the country to revisit existing dress code policies.160 Yet the
prevalence and problematic messaging of these modesty-based dress codes
persist today.

Figure 2
This Article presents a descriptive parallel between these two worlds—
the schoolhouse and the courthouse—and a normative reflection on the
corrosive impacts of the messaging sent in each world when we obsess over
the sexual nature of a woman’s clothing. It does not provide any empirical
data, or even anecdotal proof, of a direct link between increasingly
sexualized school dress codes and rape victim credibility discounts in
criminal law. That research, to the extent it is possible to conduct, would
represent a welcome and helpful next step in this discussion. Until then,
these short remarks provide a useful lens through which to critically
examine the continued desire to police but failure to protect girls’ and
women’s bodies.

160. Cf. id. (describing public support for students’ proposed dress code).
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